Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
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(80)- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver?
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
- Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
- Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
- Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation
- The epistemic structure of a theory of a game
- Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
- Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
- Communication under language barriers
- Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
- Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
- Mediated talk
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
- Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions
- Intention or request: the impact of message structures
- Language and coordination games
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Valuable cheap talk and equilibrium selection
- Expert advising under checks and balances
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- Strategic information transmission despite conflict
- The strategic role of nonbinding communication
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
- Message exchange games in strategic contexts
- Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
- Persuasion with communication costs
- Good manners: signaling social preferences
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Constrained persuasion with private information
- A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types
- Language, games, and evolution: an introduction
- Strategic Vagueness, and Appropriate Contexts
- Known unknowns: time bounds and knowledge of ignorance
- Conflict and segregation in networks: an experiment on the interplay between individual preferences and social influence
- Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach
- A tree formulation for signaling games
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
- Signaling games
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
- A note on pre-play communication
- Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Cooperation and computability in \(n\)-player games
- Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
- When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
- Fragile meaning -- an experiment
- Artificial intelligence and language
- Cheap talk with two-sided private information
- Meaning in communication games
- Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games
- Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
- On the function of language
- Signaling games with a highly effective signal
- Informal communication
- Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness
- Verifiable disclosure
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Rationalizable signaling
- Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
- Communication between rational agents
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
- A ``super folk theorem for dynastic repeated games
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