Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination

DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09795-9zbMath1470.91053OpenAlexW3119182093MaRDI QIDQ2046169

Javier Rodero Cosano, Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez

Publication date: 17 August 2021

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-020-09795-9

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationcoordinationincentivesstrategic complementaritycheap talklaboratory experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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