Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
DOI10.1007/S11238-011-9248-5zbMATH Open1274.91113OpenAlexW1978902214MaRDI QIDQ763356FDOQ763356
Authors: Ganna Pogrebna, Christian Schade, Claudia Keser, David. H. Krantz 
Publication date: 9 March 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/37685/1/WRAP_Pogrebna_Words_versus_actions.pdf
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Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)
Cites Work
- On a Test of Whether one of Two Random Variables is Stochastically Larger than the Other
- Logistic regression with random coefficients
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
- Use of Ranks in One-Criterion Variance Analysis
- A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
- What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
- Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
- A model of pre-game communication
- Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence
Cited In (10)
- Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments
- A graph-based model for public goods with leaderships
- Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
- Communication, leadership and coordination failure
- Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships
- Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game
- Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels
- Binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback in the intertemporal common-pool resource game
- Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity
- Leadership by example promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods game
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