A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
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Publication:1382001
DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2359zbMATH Open0895.90200OpenAlexW2006567420MaRDI QIDQ1382001FDOQ1382001
Authors: Vincent P. Crawford 
Publication date: 20 September 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2359
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Cites Work
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- Strategic Information Transmission
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
- When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
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- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- A model of pre-game communication
- Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
- A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication
- Communication between rational agents
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (47)
- Public and private communication are different: Results on relative expressivity
- A suggested interpretation of some experimental results on preplay communication
- Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
- Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence
- The role of suggestions and tips in distorting a third party's decision
- Introduction to experimental game theory
- Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
- Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
- Truth and trust in communication: experiments on the effect of a competitive context
- Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium.
- The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
- Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis
- What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence
- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- The circulation of worthless tokens aids cooperation: an experiment inspired by the Kula
- The anticipatory effect of nonverbal communication
- Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination
- Speech is silver, silence is golden
- Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information
- The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners. A study based on field and laboratory data
- Consensus Game: An Extension of Battle of the Sexes Game
- Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis
- The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: an experiment
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game
- Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- A collaborative decentralized distribution system with demand forecast updates
- Editorial. New directions in behavioral game theory: introduction to the special issue
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
- Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels
- Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
- Authority and communication in the laboratory
- Promises and endogenous reneging costs
- Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence
- Gossip and the efficiency of interactions
- Commitment to the truth creates trust in market exchange: experimental evidence
- Inference from biased polls
- An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games
- Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach
- Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
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