Gossip and the efficiency of interactions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.10.003zbMath1419.91185OpenAlexW3124486315WikidataQ129070925 ScholiaQ129070925MaRDI QIDQ1735762

Dietmar Fehr, Matthias Sutter

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141463

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcommunicationefficiencytrust gamegossip

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations -- an experimental study
• Competition fosters trust
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• Bare promises: an experiment
• Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence
• Trust and trustworthiness across different age groups
• An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning
• Adaptive linear step-up procedures that control the false discovery rate
• RUMORS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS
• Promises and Partnership
• Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects
• Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals

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