Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations -- an experimental study

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.02.009zbMATH Open1347.91106OpenAlexW2305690886MaRDI QIDQ290156FDOQ290156

Authors: Matthias Greiff, Fabian Paetzel 

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.009

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zbMATH Keywords

conditional cooperationendogenous evaluationsindirect reciprocitynoisy reputationsecond-order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
• Competition fosters trust
• A theory of reciprocity
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?

Cited In (5)

• Social networks, reputation, and commitment: evidence from a Savings monitors experiment
• The impact of fraud on reputation systems
• Gossip and the efficiency of interactions
• On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
• Gossip: Perspective taking to establish cooperation

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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