Unraveling public good games
Summary: This paper provides experimental evidence on how players predict end-game effects in a linear public good game. Our regression analysis yields a measure of the relative importance of priors and signals on subjects' beliefs on contributions and allows us to conclude that, first, the weight of the signal is relatively unimportant, while priors have a large weight and, second, priors are the same for all periods. Hence, subjects do not expect end-game effects and there is very little updating of beliefs. We argue that the sustainability of cooperation is related to this pattern of belief formation.
- Explaining cooperative behavior in public goods games: how preferences and beliefs affect contribution levels
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1168312
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Voluntary contributions to a dynamic public good: experimental evidence
- Framing and cooperation in public good games: An experiment with an interior solution
- A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
- Framing effects in public goods: prospect theory and experimental evidence
- Inferring beliefs as subjectively imprecise probabilities
- Promises and Partnership
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- The framing of games and the psychology of play
- When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons
- Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart
- Explaining public goods game contributions with rational ability
- Belief heterogeneity and the restart effect in a public goods game
- When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons
- Public good indices for games with several levels of approval
- Explaining cooperative behavior in public goods games: how preferences and beliefs affect contribution levels
- Games, groups, and the global good
- Second-order beliefs in reputation systems with endogenous evaluations -- an experimental study
- Collective action: experimental evidence
- God games: an experimental study of uncertainty, superstition, and cooperation
This page was built for publication: Unraveling public good games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2344989)
