Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart
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Publication:1277710
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00203-1zbMath0916.90057OpenAlexW2077458796MaRDI QIDQ1277710
Theo Offerman, Arthur Schram, Joep Sonnemans
Publication date: 2 March 1999
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00203-1
Related Items (14)
On the level of cooperative behavior in a local-interaction model. ⋮ Learning process in public goods games ⋮ Cooperation and strategic complementarity: an experiment with two voluntary contribution mechanism games with interior equilibria ⋮ Instrumental reciprocity as an error ⋮ The role of fairness in competitive supply chain relationships: an experimental study ⋮ Lying in a finitely repeated game ⋮ Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games ⋮ Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game ⋮ Belief heterogeneity and the restart effect in a public goods game ⋮ Aversion to norm-breaking: A model ⋮ Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment ⋮ Giving, taking, earned money, and cooperation in public good games ⋮ EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH ⋮ Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart
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