Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
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Publication:1927791
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007zbMath1254.91157WikidataQ59238336 ScholiaQ59238336MaRDI QIDQ1927791
Enrique Fatas, Tibor Neugebauer, Rachel T. A. Croson
Publication date: 2 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/49
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Cites Work
- Partners and strangers revisited
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- Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link coordination games
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
