Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link coordination games

DOI10.1023/A:1026257921046MaRDI QIDQ1430264zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Roberto A. Weber, Colin Camerer, Marc J. Knez

Publication date 27 May 2004

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026257921046

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesexperimentstiming

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Cited in

(17)

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• Ideal reactive equilibrium
• Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study
• Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
• Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?-an experimental analysis
• Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment
• Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
• Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
• Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
• Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: framing effects in repeated matching pennies games
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
• Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance

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