Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link coordination games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1430264
DOI10.1023/A:1026257921046zbMath1097.91503MaRDI QIDQ1430264
Colin F. Camerer, Roberto A. Weber, Marc J. Knez
Publication date: 27 May 2004
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?-an experimental analysis, Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment, Noisy leadership: An experimental approach, The role of gender composition and size of the group in a minimum effort game, Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games, Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games, Ideal reactive equilibrium, Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: framing effects in repeated matching pennies games, Foundations of boundedly rational choice and satisficing decisions, Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game, Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study, Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction, Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance, Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions, Experience-weighted attraction learning in coordination games: Probability rules, heterogeneity, and time-variation, Beyond Normal Form Invariance: First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk
