Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
DOI10.1007/S10683-010-9236-6zbMATH Open1231.91057OpenAlexW2099447659MaRDI QIDQ975372FDOQ975372
Authors: Anders U. Poulsen, Michael W. M. Roos 
Publication date: 9 June 2010
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://github.com/ueaeco/working-papers/raw/master/papers/afe/UEA-AFE-007.pdf
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experimentbargainingcommitmentendogenous timingstrategic commitmentphysical timing effectsstrategic value of information
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- From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
- Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study
Cited In (3)
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