Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
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Cites work
- Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction
- Commitment Value of Contracts Under Renegotiation Constraints
- Commitment and observability in games
- Discrimination in a segmented society: an experimental approach.
- Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data.
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
- From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence
- Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: an experimental study
- Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
- Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
- Playing Cournot although they shouldn't: endogenous timing in experimental duopolies with asymmetric cost
- Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis
- Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
- Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Stable equilibria and forward induction
- Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and ``weak link coordination games
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- Unobserved Delegation
Cited in
(5)- Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority
- Preferences for the resolution of uncertainty and the timing of information
- Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments
- On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money
- Feigning ignorance for long-term gains
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