Unobserved Delegation
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Publication:4375441
DOI10.2307/2527214zbMath0891.90046OpenAlexW4242711350MaRDI QIDQ4375441
Publication date: 27 July 1998
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527214
2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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