Unobserved Delegation

DOI10.2307/2527214zbMATH Open0891.90046OpenAlexW4242711350MaRDI QIDQ4375441FDOQ4375441

Chaim Fershtman, Ehud Kalai

Publication date: 27 July 1998

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527214

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zbMATH Keywords

commitment via delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (17)

• STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES
• Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result
• Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance
• Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
• A commitment folk theorem
• Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
• There is a free lunch after all
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
• Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives
• Oblivious Collaboration
• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
• On the impact of an intermediary agent in the ultimatum game
• Privatization, incentive delegation and foreign direct investment
• Unobservable contracts as precommitments
• Games played in a contracting environment

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