Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment
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Publication:1973451
DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0728zbMATH Open0962.91013OpenAlexW2160523509MaRDI QIDQ1973451FDOQ1973451
Blaine Snyder, Andrew Schotter, Wei Zheng
Publication date: 27 April 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c964687c286830454b6376d38aa6c360ce3f7e63
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
- Unobserved Delegation
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
- The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
- Strategic delegation in bargaining
- The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
- Reinterpreting arbitration's narcotic effect: An experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining
Cited In (5)
- Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives
- Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
- On the impact of an intermediary agent in the ultimatum game
- When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game
- Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence
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