A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining

From MaRDI portal
Publication:3936540

DOI10.2307/1912604zbMath0478.90091OpenAlexW2038853433MaRDI QIDQ3936540

Vincent P. Crawford

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912604




Related Items

The bargaining correspondence: when Edgeworth meets NashUnion Leaders as Experts: Wage Bargaining and Strikes with Union-Wide Ballot Requirements*Optimal stalling when bargainingMultilateral bargaining with concession costsMixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash demand gameBargaining and waning commitmentsCommitment in alternating offers bargainingAppeasement or Radicalism: A Game Between Intruders and OccupiersA bargaining model in general equilibriumBargaining with history-dependent preferencesBargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitmentTough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitmentsBargaining with revoking costsBayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communicationFinal-offer arbitration with uncertainty averse partiesAlternative equilibria in two-period ultimatum bargaining with envyNonbinding recommendations: The relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomesBargaining with random implementation: an experimental studyAlgorithms for cautious reasoning in gamesCOMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENTDelegation and threat in bargainingThe effects of beliefs versus risk attitude on bargaining outcomesExternalities and bargaining disagreementRandom-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon casesOn the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilitiesBargaining with imperfect commitmentThe power of outside options in the presence of obstinate typesRevising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems