A bargaining model in general equilibrium
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Publication:2431097
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0515-4zbMath1214.91042OpenAlexW1969503279MaRDI QIDQ2431097
Michele Gori, Antonio Villanacci
Publication date: 8 April 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0515-4
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory (91B51)
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