Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
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Publication:2373772
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
- A theory of hyperfinite processes: The complete removal of individual uncertainty via exact LLN
- Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
- Conversion from Nonstandard to Standard Measure Spaces and Applications in Probability Theory
- Differential information economies
- Differential information economies: Introduction
- Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- Informational robustness of competitive equilibria.
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- Private information in large economies
- The almost equivalence of pairwise and mutual independence and the duality with exchangeability
- The core of an economy with differential information
- The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
Cited in
(27)- Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies
- Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
- Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications
- Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
- Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
- On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization
- Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium
- On the space of players in idealized limit games
- Markets and contracts
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- A bargaining model in general equilibrium
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2209547 (Why is no real title available?)
- Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
- Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
- Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
- ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE: A Perspective on “Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation”
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences
- On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information
- Entry and social efficiency under Bertrand competition and asymmetric information
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