Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.001zbMath1158.91421OpenAlexW2152369534MaRDI QIDQ2373772

Yeneng Sun, Nicholas C. Yannelis

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.001

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationPareto efficiencyperfect competitionincentive compatibilitynegligible private informationwalrasian allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (17)

Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies ⋮ Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge ⋮ Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization ⋮ Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information ⋮ Equilibria and incentives in private information economies ⋮ Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ On the space of players in idealized limit games ⋮ A bargaining model in general equilibrium ⋮ Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility ⋮ Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case ⋮ Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies ⋮ Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications ⋮ On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

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