Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications
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Publication:1798797
DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1067-7zbMath1416.91028OpenAlexW2737210134MaRDI QIDQ1798797
Publication date: 23 October 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1067-7
convexityconditional expectationcompactnessstochastic gameslarge gamescorrespondencesabstract economiesnowhere equivalencepreservation of upper hemicontinuity
Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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