Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria with coarser traits
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Publication:2158355
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Cites work
- A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
- Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications
- Convex analysis and measurable multifunctions
- Large games with a bio-social typology
- Large games with transformed summary statistics
- Modeling infinitely many agents
- Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games
- Real analysis
- Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distributions in large distributional games
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