Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria with coarser traits

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2022.110464zbMATH Open1493.91007OpenAlexW4226411221WikidataQ115216138 ScholiaQ115216138MaRDI QIDQ2158355FDOQ2158355

Bin Wu, Hanping Xu

Publication date: 26 July 2022

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110464

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcoarser traitslarge games with traitsPareto-undominatedsocially-maximal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Convex analysis and measurable multifunctions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Large games with a bio-social typology
• A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Large games with transformed summary statistics
• Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games
• Modeling infinitely many agents
• Socially-maximal Nash equilibrium distributions in large distributional games
• Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications

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