Large games with a bio-social typology
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Publication:2447060
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.11.002zbMath1285.91013MaRDI QIDQ2447060
Haomiao Yu, Yeneng Sun, Kali P. Rath, M. Ali Khan
Publication date: 23 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://economics.ryerson.ca/workingpapers/wp035.pdf
traits; large games; pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; closed-graph property; saturated probability space; upper hemi-continuity; asymptotic implementation; idealized limit game; social type
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