Large games with countable characteristics

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.011zbMath1133.91308OpenAlexW1989978870MaRDI QIDQ2482639

Guilherme Carmona

Publication date: 23 April 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/803983/1/cc070521.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumequilibrium distributionsgames with a continuum of players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (4)

Large games with a bio-social typology ⋮ Strategic behavior in non-atomic games ⋮ A remark on the measurability of large games ⋮ On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games

Cites Work

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• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• On equilibrium allocations as distributions on the commodity space
• Non-cooperative games on hyperfinite Loeb spaces
• On the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Extremal structures and symmetric equilibria with countable actions
• Representation of finite action large games
• Pure strategies in games with private information

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