On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games

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Publication:1017797

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.009zbMath1166.91306OpenAlexW3123474672WikidataQ56081765 ScholiaQ56081765MaRDI QIDQ1017797

Konrad Podczeck, Guilherme Carmona

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/803990/1/k081124.pdf




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