College assignment as a large contest

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.006MaRDI QIDQ1753683zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed, Brent R. Hickman

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

contestsaffirmative actionapproximate equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
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Cited in

(10)

• Retaking in high stakes exams: is less more?
• College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
• Winner's effort maximization in large contests
• GAMING A SELECTIVE ADMISSIONS SYSTEM
• On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
• The role of colleges within the higher education sector
• Simultaneous screening and college admissions
• Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges
• Ability grouping in contests
• Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based

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