Student portfolios and the college admissions problem
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Publication:4610673
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDU003zbMATH Open1405.91472OpenAlexW3121806511MaRDI QIDQ4610673FDOQ4610673
Authors: Hector Chade, Gregory M. Lewis, Lones Smith 
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12363836
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- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study
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- A binomial decision tree to manage <scp>yield‐uncertainty</scp> in <scp>multi‐round</scp> academic admissions processes
- Simultaneous screening and college admissions
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- Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges
- College applications and the effect of affirmative action
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based
- Price Discrimination and Public Policy in the US College Market
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
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