scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7626775
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Publication:5053286
Publication date: 6 December 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.00159
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- Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems
- Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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