Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures
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Publication:2482671
DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0081-6zbMATH Open1139.91025OpenAlexW2163984834MaRDI QIDQ2482671FDOQ2482671
Authors: Kimmo Eriksson, Olle Häggström 
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0081-6
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Cites Work
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- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- The Average Number of Stable Matchings
- Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
Cited In (21)
- Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
- Stable secretaries
- Local matching dynamics in social networks
- Size versus stability in the marriage problem
- An improved approximation lower bound for finding almost stable maximum matchings
- ``Almost stable matchings in the roommates problem with bounded preference lists
- Size Versus Stability in the Marriage Problem
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Almost stable matchings by truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- A stable marriage requires communication
- Measuring the instability in two-sided matching procedures
- How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
- Multi-agent reinforcement learning for decentralized stable matching
- A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
- Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
- ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
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