Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures
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Publication:2482671
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms
- Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem
- The Average Number of Stable Matchings
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
Cited in
(29)- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- A stable marriage requires communication
- Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals
- An improved approximation lower bound for finding almost stable maximum matchings
- Size Versus Stability in the Marriage Problem
- ``Almost stable matchings in the roommates problem with bounded preference lists
- Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach
- The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Almost stable matchings by truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- Decentralized matching markets of various sizes: similarly stable solutions with high proportions of equal splits
- Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Jealousy graphs: structure and complexity of decentralized stable matching
- Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
- How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates?
- Bayesian stable states
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Stable secretaries
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7626775 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multi-agent reinforcement learning for decentralized stable matching
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
- Measuring the instability in two-sided matching procedures
- Local matching dynamics in social networks
- Size versus stability in the marriage problem
- Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
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