Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6076902
DOI10.3982/TE4882MaRDI QIDQ6076902FDOQ6076902
Authors: Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, Ton Storcken
Publication date: 17 October 2023
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Consistency and its converse: an introduction
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- The Borda dictionary
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Median stable matching for college admissions
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- School Choice with Consent*
- A theory of school-choice lotteries
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets
- School choice: an experimental study
- Impossibilities for roommate problems
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- A re-characterization of the Kemeny distance
- Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
- Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
Cited In (2)
This page was built for publication: Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6076902)