Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1945450
DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9319-2zbMath1273.91154MaRDI QIDQ1945450
James W. Boudreau, Vicki Knoblauch
Publication date: 8 April 2013
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9319-2
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Cites Work
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