The Geometry of Fractional Stable Matchings and Its Applications
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Publication:2757570
DOI10.1287/moor.23.4.874zbMath0977.90046OpenAlexW2114200231MaRDI QIDQ2757570
Jay Sethuraman, Chung-Piaw Teo
Publication date: 26 November 2001
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.4.874
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60) Cooperative games (91A12) Combinatorial optimization (90C27)
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