Stable sharing
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Publication:6176743
Recommendations
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
- The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
- On computing Pareto stable assignments
Cites work
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
- Division rules and migration equilibria
- Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
- Matching with partners and projects
- Microeconomic theory
- On Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the K-K-M-S theorem and the core of a balanced game
- Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility
- Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments
- The Core of an N Person Game
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
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