Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- The lexicographic egalitarian solution on economic environments
- Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems
- Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
- Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints
Cited in
(19)- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Entropy, desegregation, and proportional rationing
- The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences
- Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910754 (Why is no real title available?)
- Networks of common property resources
- Stable sharing
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Cost sharing in networks: some open questions
- Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
- Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
- Mechanism design in fair sequencing
- Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints
- Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets
- Allocation rules on networks
- Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson
- Constrained egalitarianism in a simple redistributive model
This page was built for publication: Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1945835)
