Constrained egalitarianism in a simple redistributive model
Dutta and Ray have introduced a concept of egalitarianism with a constraint about availability in which coalitions can defect and prevent the egalitarian aim of the society as a whole. In this paper, the authors extend Dutta and Ray's analysis by giving weights to agents and by considering proportionate justice rather than equality. In this framework, they study distributive problems involving a center which transfers money to and receive money from a group of agents (possibly overlapping). Finally, they compare their solution with the solution based on the Shapley value.
- Constrained egalitarian allocations
- Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems
- Egalitarian allocations and convexity
- A simple axiomatization of the egalitarian solution
- Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
- Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Towards equitable distribution via proportional equity constraints
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good
- Balanced egaliterian redistribution of income
- Hierarchical constrained egalitarianism in TU-games.
- Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems
- Philippe Mongin (1950-2020)
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- Monotonicity of social welfare optima
- Truncated egalitarian solutions
- Philippe Mongin 1950--2020
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