Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
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Publication:1945835
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.09.016zbMATH Open1275.91080OpenAlexW2093822473MaRDI QIDQ1945835FDOQ1945835
Authors: Olivier Bochet, Rahmi İlkılıç, Hervé Moulin 
Publication date: 17 April 2013
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/12866
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- Cost sharing in networks: some open questions
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- Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson
- Efficient, fair, and strategy-proof (re)allocation under network constraints
- Entropy, desegregation, and proportional rationing
- Constrained egalitarianism in a simple redistributive model
- Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems
- Networks of common property resources
- The replacement principle in networked economies with single-peaked preferences
- Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
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