Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6604768
Recommendations
- A simple characterization of the uniform rule
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible
Cites work
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A simple characterization of the uniform rule
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
- Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Let them cheat!
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
- On the implementation of the median
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Toward Natural Implementation
This page was built for publication: Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6604768)
