Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105879zbMATH Open1544.91159MaRDI QIDQ6604768FDOQ6604768

Authors: Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai, William Thomson 

Publication date: 13 September 2024

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

implementationfair allocationuniform ruledirect revelation mechanismsmanipulation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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