Recommendations
Cites work
- A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
Cited in
(17)- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof
- On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
- Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities
- Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
- Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
- Relevance of winning coalitions in indirect control of corporations
- Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: a complete character\-ization
- Alliances and Related Domination Parameters
- Two-group contests with communication within and between groups
- Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria in a normal-form game and its subgames
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
- Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games
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