Two-group contests with communication within and between groups

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_15MaRDI QIDQ4555516zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Federico Quartieri, Ryusuke Shinohara

Publication date 20 November 2018

Published in Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_15

zbMATH Keywords

contest success functiongeneral Nash equilibriumNash equilibriumNash equilibrium uniquenesspayoff function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
• Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize
• Group contest success functions
• On the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric public-good contests
• Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games

Cites work

• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
• Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
• Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts
• The theory of contests: a survey

Cited in

(6)

• On the competition of two conflicting messages
• Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
• Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest
• Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
• Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests
• Optimal decision of aggregation method in group contest: going all out vs. staying half-hearted

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