On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2481zbMath0920.90145MaRDI QIDQ1289254

Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 27 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2481

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; coalitional deviation; common agency games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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Cites Work

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• On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency