On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
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Cites work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
Cited in
(20)- Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
- Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
- A note on budget constraints and outside options in common agency
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
- Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information
- Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
- Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Two-group contests with communication within and between groups
- Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
- On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
- Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
- Secure implementation in allotment economies
- Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
- Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities
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