Secure implementation in allotment economies

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.023zbMATH Open1197.91119OpenAlexW2171498154MaRDI QIDQ844906FDOQ844906

Authors Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai 

Publication date 5 February 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.023

zbMATH Keywords

fair allocationstrategy-proofnesspriority ruleNash implementationuniform rulesecure implementationcoalition-proof Nash equilibriumsingle-peaked preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Credible implementation
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference

Cites Work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
• Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

Cited In (11)

• Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
• Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
• An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
• Secure implementation in production economies
• The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
• Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
• Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems

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