Secure implementation in allotment economies
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.04.023zbMATH Open1197.91119OpenAlexW2171498154MaRDI QIDQ844906FDOQ844906
Authors: Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai 
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.023
Recommendations
fair allocationstrategy-proofnesspriority ruleNash implementationuniform rulesecure implementationcoalition-proof Nash equilibriumsingle-peaked preference
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- A simple characterization of the uniform rule
- Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
- On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
- Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
- Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Cited In (10)
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
- Secure implementation in production economies
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
- Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
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