Secure implementation in allotment economies

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.023zbMath1197.91119OpenAlexW2171498154MaRDI QIDQ844906

Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.023

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof Nash equilibriumstrategy-proofnessfair allocationpriority ruleNash implementationuniform rulesecure implementationsingle-peaked preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (9)

The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization ⋮ Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Secure implementation in production economies ⋮ Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules ⋮ An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions ⋮ Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
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• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
• Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
• Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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