Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0645-ZzbMATH Open1288.91058OpenAlexW1964249253MaRDI QIDQ2452127FDOQ2452127

Authors: Hirofumi Yamamura, Ryo Kawasaki 

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0645-z

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing
• Potential games
• Games of fair division
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
• Best-response potential games
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
• Secure implementation in allotment economies
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
• UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS

Cited In (11)

• On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
• Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• On the implementation of the median
• Strategic vote trading under complete information
• Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
• Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
• Implementation via approval mechanisms
• Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• On the costly voting model: the mean rule
• Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness

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