Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
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Publication:2452127
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0645-ZzbMATH Open1288.91058OpenAlexW1964249253MaRDI QIDQ2452127FDOQ2452127
Hirofumi Yamamura, Ryo Kawasaki
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0645-z
Cites Work
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- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS
Cited In (11)
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- On the implementation of the median
- Strategic vote trading under complete information
- Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
- Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- On the costly voting model: the mean rule
- Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
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