An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
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Publication:1322422
DOI10.1007/BF00179209zbMath0803.90004MaRDI QIDQ1322422
Publication date: 5 May 1994
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)
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