The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.09.004zbMATH Open1331.91108OpenAlexW2192035873MaRDI QIDQ899384FDOQ899384

G. Bergantiños, Sunyoung Kim, Youngsub Chun

Publication date: 28 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.09.004

Recommendations

• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
• Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• The division problem with voluntary participation
• Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• The division problem under constraints
• When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
• A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems
• Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

Cited In (3)

• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

This page was built for publication: The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q899384)