The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.09.004MaRDI QIDQ899384zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sunyoung Kim, G. Bergantiños, Youngsub Chun

Publication date 28 December 2015

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.09.004

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
• A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
• Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems
• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
• Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
• Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences
• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The division problem under constraints
• The division problem with voluntary participation
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences
• When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds

Cited in

(3)

• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

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