Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences

DOI10.2307/2938291zbMath0747.90007OpenAlexW4241014394MaRDI QIDQ3989225

Peter P. Wakker, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b2b8aaeee5d1de24fd25a00d91d4837f12a8f6e4

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternativesNash bargaining solutionstrong axiom of revealed preferencecontinuous single-valued choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (25)

Introduction to the special issue in honor of Peter Wakker ⋮ Law of demand and stochastic choice ⋮ Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Appeals immune bargaining solution with variable alternative sets ⋮ Single-peaked choice ⋮ Stability, fairness and random walks in the bargaining problem ⋮ Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: rationalizability and Nash solutions ⋮ Fuzzy choice functions, revealed preference and rationality ⋮ On recursive solutions to simple allocation problems ⋮ Cycle-preserving extension of demand functions to new commodities ⋮ Bargaining on monotonic social choice environments ⋮ The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints ⋮ A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems ⋮ A canon of probabilistic rationality ⋮ Ex-ante estate division under strong Pareto efficiency ⋮ Uncovered bargaining solutions ⋮ Rational choice with status quo bias ⋮ Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice ⋮ Maximality with or without binariness: transfer-type characterizations ⋮ Rational choice and two-person bargaining solutions ⋮ Rationality of bargaining solutions ⋮ Welfarism and rationalizability in allocation problems with indivisibilities ⋮ Inequality averse collective choice ⋮ Choice on the simplex domain ⋮ The Choquet bargaining solutions

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