Single-peaked choice

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0393-1zbMath1180.91087MaRDI QIDQ836878

Walter Bossert, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0393-1

zbMATH Keywords

representability; choice functions; rationalizability; single-peakedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B12: Voting theory

91B10: Group preferences

Related Items

A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems, A characterization of the single-peaked domain

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