Generalized median voter schemes and committees
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1317325
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1069zbMath0792.90005OpenAlexW1981122704MaRDI QIDQ1317325
Ennio Stacchetti, Faruk Gul, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 17 April 1994
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1069
Related Items
Divergent platforms, Dictatorship on top-circular domains, Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization, Single-peaked choice, On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties, Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains, Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?, Single-peaked preferences over multidimensional binary alternatives, Single-plateaued choice, Voting under constraints, Strategy-proofness and ``median voters, A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules, Strategy-proof partitioning, Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel, Immunity to credible deviations from the truth, On single-peaked domains and min-max rules, Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices, Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains, Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains, Spatial implementation, Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains, A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains, Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains, Tops-only domains, Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions, New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness, Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources, Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?, On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences, Measuring nearly single-peakedness of an electorate: some new insights, Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness, Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting, On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness, Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations, On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions, Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules, A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents, Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains, Single-basined choice, ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS, Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices, Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good, Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules, Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour, A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model, Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers, On random social choice functions with the tops-only property, Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods, Strategy-proof location of public facilities, The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences, Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties, Strategy-proof location on a network, Voting by committees under constraints, Foundations of spatial preferences, Salvador Barberà, Median stable matching for college admissions, Random dictatorship domains, Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences, On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals, Truthful aggregation of budget proposals, Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments, The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces, Strategyproof and efficient preference aggregation with Kemeny-based criteria, Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size, Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences, On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness, Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains, The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm, Voting on multiple issues: What to put on the ballot?, Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges, Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms, Information disclosure with many alternatives, Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities, Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization, Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs, Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences, Social Choice Theory, Dictatorship versus manipulability, Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure, Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences, Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains, Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions, Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
