Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
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Publication:505276
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.010zbMath1397.91187OpenAlexW2523354928MaRDI QIDQ505276
Publication date: 19 January 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.010
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