Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A new characterization of the majority rule
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda
- Anonymous and neutral majority rules
- Another characterization of the majority rule.
- Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
- Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Dividing resources by flexible majority rules
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5343725 (Why is no real title available?)
- Majority selection of one alternative from a binary agenda
- Minority voting and long-term decisions
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- On the limits of democracy
- Optimal voting rules
- Storable votes
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Tops-only domains
- Update monotone preference rules
Cited in
(8)- Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
- Voting with public information
- Dividing resources by flexible majority rules
- Pirates in wonderland: liquid democracy has bicriteria guarantees
- Redesigning Democracy
- From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics
- On the limits of democracy
- Semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision
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