A new characterization of the majority rule
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Publication:1927374
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00145-9zbMath1254.91130MaRDI QIDQ1927374
Publication date: 1 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00145-9
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