Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0154-7zbMath1134.91364OpenAlexW1998621854MaRDI QIDQ866931

Ugur Ozdemir, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 14 February 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0154-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility ⋮ Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence ⋮ Superdictatorial domains for monotonic social choice functions ⋮ Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes ⋮ Structure of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence ⋮ Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence ⋮ A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions ⋮ Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets ⋮ Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains ⋮ A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey

Cites Work

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