Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets
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Publication:997203
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.01.006zbMath1283.91046OpenAlexW2041496510MaRDI QIDQ997203
Publication date: 23 July 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.01.006
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremArrow's impossibilitysocial choice hyperfunctionsuperdictatorial domain
Cites Work
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes