Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:997203
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.01.006zbMATH Open1283.91046OpenAlexW2041496510MaRDI QIDQ997203FDOQ997203
Authors: Levent Kutlu
Publication date: 23 July 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.01.006
Recommendations
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
- Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory
- Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences
- A comment on Arrow's impossibility theorem
- On the Size of Minimum Super Arrovian Domains
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremArrow's impossibilitysocial choice hyperfunctionsuperdictatorial domain
Cites Work
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
Cited In (6)
- Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory
- Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Aggregating sets of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
- Preference modeling on totally ordered sets by the Sugeno integral
- Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
This page was built for publication: Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q997203)