Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.01.006MaRDI QIDQ997203zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Levent Kutlu

Publication date 23 July 2007

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremArrow's impossibilitysocial choice hyperfunctionsuperdictatorial domain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
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Cites work

• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
• Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
• Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.

Cited in

(6)

• Preference modeling on totally ordered sets by the Sugeno integral
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4005933 (Why is no real title available?)
• Arrovian aggregation of convex preferences
• Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
• Arrovian aggregation of generalised expected-utility preferences: (im)possibility results by means of model theory
• Aggregating sets of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities

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