Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
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Publication:2426966
DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0253-0zbMath1137.91371OpenAlexW2035733126MaRDI QIDQ2426966
Publication date: 14 May 2008
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0253-0
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