A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
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Publication:2389312
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026zbMath1165.91365MaRDI QIDQ2389312
M. Remzi Sanver, Selçuk Özyurt
Publication date: 15 July 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026
strategy-proofness; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; hyperfunctions; manipulation; social choice correspondences
91B14: Social choice
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