Circular domains
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Publication:707698
DOI10.1007/S10058-010-0102-YzbMATH Open1233.91092OpenAlexW3190379399MaRDI QIDQ707698FDOQ707698
Publication date: 8 October 2010
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0102-y
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Tops-only domains
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Special domains and nonmanipulability
- The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Dictatorial domains
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
- On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
Cited In (24)
- Further results on dictatorial domains
- A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives
- Intrinsic circle domains
- A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains
- Dictatorship on top-circular domains
- On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
- Random dictatorship domains
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
- Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
- Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
- A decomposition of strategy-proofness
- A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Ring domains with separating circles or separating annuli
- An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions
- Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
- Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
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