Circular domains

DOI10.1007/s10058-010-0102-yzbMath1233.91092OpenAlexW3190379399MaRDI QIDQ707698

Shin Sato

Publication date: 8 October 2010

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-010-0102-y

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnesscircular domaingroup strategy-proofnessessential social choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (22)

Dictatorship on top-circular domains ⋮ Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model ⋮ A decomposition of strategy-proofness ⋮ An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions ⋮ Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains ⋮ Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures ⋮ Further results on dictatorial domains ⋮ A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives ⋮ Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains ⋮ A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? ⋮ On strategy-proof social choice under categorization ⋮ Random dictatorship domains ⋮ Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains ⋮ A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness ⋮ Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs ⋮ Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information ⋮ A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions

Cites Work

• Tops-only domains
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
• Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Dictatorial domains
• The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Special domains and nonmanipulability
• On the alternating use of ``unanimity and ``surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
• A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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